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INTRODUCTION
As the last act of its 2014-2015 Term, the Supreme Court struck
down a major EPA regulation limiting mercury emissions from electrical
power plants. 1 The formal legal reason was EPA’s failure to consider the
costs of regulating mercury before deciding that it must be regulated. 2 But
the costs of the regulation—$9.6 billion—would not have attracted such
attention if they had not seemed so disproportionate to the regulatory
benefits. The only mercury-related benefits that EPA could measure and
include in its analysis related to the possibility that mercury exposure would
slightly reduce the IQ of the children born to women who consumed fish
high in mercury while pregnant. 3 Against $9.6 billion in costs, EPA
calculated only $5 million in benefits—a ratio of 1,920 to 1. 4 The imbalance
in this ratio had a significant impact upon the court. As Justice Scalia wrote
for the majority in Michigan v. EPA, “One would not say that it is even
rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic
costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.” 5

† Masur is John P. Wilson Professor of Law and David and Celia Hilliard Research
Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished
Service Professor and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair, University of Chicago Law
School. We thank Daniel Farber, Victor Gilinsky, Jennifer Nou, David Weisbach, and
participants in the conference on Federal Agency Decision-Making Under Deep
Uncertainty, held at the University of Chicago, for helpful comments and conversations,
and Paul Rogerson for excellent research assistance. Masur thanks the David and Celia
Hilliard Fund for research support; Posner thanks the Russell Baker Scholars Fund.
1
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2,699 (2015).
2
Id. at 2,711.
3
EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards ES-1
(2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf.
We
describe the legal rule governing the case and the Court’s holding in greater detail in Part
IV, infra.
4
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. at 2,705-06.
5
Id. at 2,707.
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Yet saving a few IQ points was not the only benefit from regulating
mercury, as EPA well understood. EPA believed that human exposure to
mercury emissions caused developmental delays, memory loss, and
behavioral dysfunctions; harmed cardiovascular health; and resulted in a
variety of toxic immunologic effects. 6 Mercury emissions also harm fish,
birds, and mammals, and the recreational hunters and fishermen who catch
them. 7 By reducing mercury emissions, the regulation would produce
numerous health and environmental benefits. The problem was that EPA
did not quantify any of these benefits. They are discussed in the regulation
at great length, and the regulation includes citations to scientific and
economic studies on these other effects of mercury. 8 But the agency did not
place a dollar figure on the value of these benefits. 9 That decision was fatal
to the regulation.
This is hardly the only instance in which an agency has failed to
fully quantify the costs or benefits of its regulations. Regulatory agencies
are required to perform cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of major rules.10
However, in many cases regulators refuse to report a monetized value for
the benefits of a rule that they issue. Sometimes, they report no monetized
value; 11 at other times, they report a monetized value but also state that not
all benefits have been quantified. 12 On occasion, regulators also refuse to
monetize or fully monetize costs. 13 These practices raise a puzzle. Costbenefit analysis is a decision-procedure that requires the decisionmaker to
estimate both the benefits and the costs of a regulation in monetary terms. If
a regulator chooses not to monetize all the benefits or all the costs, it is not
6

Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards at ES-10 to
ES-11.
7
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards at ES-12 to
ES-13.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See, e.g., EPA, Mercury Study Report to Congress (1997), available at
http://epa.gov/mercury/report.htm (an eight volume report detailing the magnitude of U.S.
mercury emissions and their implications); Martin Hassauer et al., European Food Safety
Auth., Collate the Literature on Toxicity Data on Mercury in Experimental Animals and
Humans (2012).
10
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No.
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4
(2003).
11
See, e.g., Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration,
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (2010).
12
Department of Justice: Disability Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division, Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Revised Regulations Implementing Titles II and
III of the ADA, Including Revised ADA Standards for Accessible Design, July 23, 2010,
http://www.ada.gov/regs2010/RIA_2010regs/DOJ%20ADA%20Final%20RIA.pdf.
13
See, e.g., id.

2
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doing cost-benefit analysis. If it is not doing cost-benefit analysis, what is it
doing?
Consider some other recent examples. The Department of
Agriculture (USDA) issued a regulation that modified the school lunch
program in light of new research on diet. 14 USDA estimated a compliance
cost of $479 to $500 million but refused to monetize benefits because it
lacked an empirical basis to estimate the effect of the improved diet on
obesity and other health problems. 15 The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued a regulation that set standards for the allowable concentration
of living organisms in ballast water that ships discharge in U.S. waters. 16
DHS estimated a compliance cost of $77 to $152 million, and benefits of $4
to $442 million, but further explained that it could not accurately estimate
(and hence monetize) most benefits because of the lack of scientific
knowledge of the likelihood that organisms discharged from ballast water
will invade U.S. territory and of how much economic damage they could
cause. 17 And the Department of Justice issued regulations that require
prisons to take steps to reduce the incidence of prison rape. 18 The agency
estimated costs of $367-375 million to improve monitoring and security but
refused to estimate benefits because it lacked information needed for
estimating the effect of the rule on the prevalence of rape (it did, however,
estimate the monetized benefit of an avoided rape). 19 All of these
regulations were promulgated despite the absence of a formal cost-benefit
analysis that monetized all the costs and benefits.
The Obama administration’s recent greenhouse gas regulation (the
“Clean Power Plan”) similarly includes significant unquantified benefits.
EPA estimated the climate change-related benefits of reducing carbon
dioxide emissions as well as related benefits from eliminating particulate
matter emissions. 20 However, it left uncalculated a wide range of other
related benefits, including reductions in morbidity and mortality due to
ozone, nitrous oxide, sulfur oxide, and mercury; environmental benefits to
14

Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Nutrition Standards in the
National School Lunch and School Breakfast, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088 (2012).
15
Id. at 4097.
16
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Positive Train Control
Systems (RRR), 77 Fed. Reg. 28,285 (2012).
17
Id. at 28,312.
18
National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,106
(June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115).
19
Id. at 37,110-11.
20
EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution Guidelines for
Existing Power Plants and Emission Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Power
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014Plants
(August
3,
2015),
06/documents/20140602ria-clean-power-plan.pdf.
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vegetation and animals; and benefits from increased atmospheric visibility
and reductions in harm to materials and homes from acid rain and other
airborne pollution. 21 Despite these unquantified benefits, EPA nonetheless
estimated that the regulation would produce between $25 and $45 billion in
net benefits by 2030. 22 The regulation was cost-benefit justified even
without the additional benefits. But the agency’s failure to quantify these
additional benefits implies that EPA would have been justified in
promulgating an even stronger and more stringent greenhouse gas
regulation had it fully accounted for the benefits such regulation would
provide.
If regulators are supposed to perform cost-benefit analyses of major
rules, why are so many rules without monetized costs and benefits issued?
A tempting explanation is that regulators are sometimes compelled by
statute to issue regulations, and so they must do so, whether or not those
regulations satisfy a cost-benefit analysis. 23 But there is a deeper problem
here. Even in such cases, regulators are required by an executive order to
perform cost-benefit analysis. 24 They can conduct a cost-benefit analysis,
find that a regulation fails it, and nonetheless issue the regulation with the
accompanying cost-benefit analysis. They can explain that they must issue
the regulation because of a statute, or that they choose to issue the
regulation because it has desirable impacts on equity, fairness, or the
distribution of wealth. But they must—and should—still provide a valid
cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis provides information to
Congress and the public. If the statute forces the agency to promulgate a
regulation whose costs exceed its benefits, a cost-benefit analysis will
reveal to Congress that statute was inefficient and that it should avoid
similar statutes in the future. Yet in most cases agencies do not perform
these cost-benefit analyses.
We suspect that it would be embarrassing for a regulator to issue a
regulation that fails a cost-benefit analysis by its own admission. Moreover,
even if there is a statutory mandate, the regulator may fear that regulation
would be vulnerable to attack as arbitrary and capricious. 25 Thus, it will be
tempting for regulators to claim unquantifiable benefits even when they can
be quantified.

21

Id. at Table ES-6 (ES-13).
Id. at Table ES-9 (ES-22).
23
See infra Part II.
24
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No.
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
25
See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
22
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To investigate these and other possibilities, we compiled a data set
consisting of all major regulations issued by agencies from 2010 to 2013.
After analyzing the dataset we come to the following conclusions. First,
there are countless examples (far more than we can describe) where
agencies fail to fully monetize the benefits and costs of regulations. Second,
in most cases, agencies could easily monetize or partially monetize those
benefits and costs. Third, even where monetization would be difficult, the
agencies could and should have made explicit the implicit valuations they
relied on and supported those valuations as much as possible with empirical
evidence.
We then proceed to explain how agencies could engage in costbenefit analysis even when they do not have a reliable basis for estimating
valuations. We recommend that agencies take a Bayesian turn. Even where
they lack complete data, agency regulators may be able to make reasonable
guesses about the harms or benefits from regulations. In many cases, these
guesses will be based on the experience and latent knowledge of the agency
staff. These preliminary guesses constitute Bayesian prior probabilities.
While agencies should be permitted to “guess”—that is, supply a subjective
prior probability—they must also be required to update their estimates as
they gain new information. In particular, agencies should be required (1) to
provide a mechanism for empirically evaluating their estimates after the
regulation is issued; (2) to revisit and update their earlier estimates in light
of what subsequent studies reveal; and (3) to use consistent estimates across
agencies. In this way, we propose a Bayesian institutional solution to the
problem of regulatory uncertainty.
Our paper is related to two strands in the legal literature. A number
of papers have criticized regulatory agencies for failing to properly
monetize costs and benefits. 26 The authors of these papers suggest that if
benefits cannot be quantified, they should be set at zero. 27 We argue that
this view is mistaken. Another group of papers argue about various ways
that agencies can deal with hard-to-monetize costs and benefits. Some
authors argue that agencies should regulate without monetizing benefits and
costs, but these authors have had trouble explaining how they think
agencies should decide what to do. 28 For example, John Coates argues that
financial regulators should weigh costs and benefits without quantifying
them; we do not understand what that could mean. 29 A few efforts have
26

See infra note 50.
See infra note 54.
28
See infra note __.
29
See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882, 998 (2015); compare Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (2013); Eric A.
27
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been made to supply agencies with a formal framework for acting in the
face of unquantified benefits. 30 Contrary to these approaches, in this paper
we suggest how agencies might engage in normal cost-benefit analysis even
in the face of uncertainty. 31
I. THE MODERN STATE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An enormous literature describes CBA, how it is used in
government, and whether it is appropriate for regulators to employ it. 32 For
reasons of space, we will skip over most of these issues, and focus on those
features of CBA and its history that are relevant to the present inquiry into
the problem of unquantified benefits.
A.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis is a decision-procedure that an agent uses to
decide whether or not to take a course of action. 33 To use CBA, the agent
determines the costs and benefits of the action in monetary terms, and
engages in the action only if the benefits exceed the costs, or—to use some
terminology that will be helpful later in this paper—the benefit/cost ratio
exceeds one.
When regulators use CBA, they should—in theory—perform a
rigorous analysis based on available empirical data; “guesstimates” will not

Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud.
S1 (2014). See generally Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis,
2015 Utah L. Rev. 93 (2015).
30
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 1369 (2014);
Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law) (Harvard Public
Law Working Paper No. 13-24, 2013).
31
Our argument is similar in spirit to Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the
Precautionary Principle, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 265 (2002), although Charest’s
main interest is how Bayes’ rule may help address concerns underlying the precautionary
principle and help reconcile that principle with cost-benefit analysis. See also David M.
Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can They Be Reconciled?,
2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 771 (2013) (making similar argument). We are skeptical that
Bayes’ rule advances the values underlying the precautionary principle, but this debate lies
outside the scope of our paper. For a brief discussion of Bayesian approach to cost-benefit
analysis of financial regulations, see Robert P. Bartlett III, The Institutional Framework for
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale of Four Paradigms?, 43 J. Legal
Stud. S379 (2015).
32
The literature is too vast to cite. Book-length treatments include Cass Sunstein, The CostBenefit State (2002); Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit
Analysis (2006); Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality (2011).
33
Adler & Posner, supra note 32, at 6.
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do. 34 Consider the USDA’s school lunch program. 35 If the program requires
schools to provide children with apples rather than a bag of potato chips,
then the cost of the program is the price of an apple minus the price of the
bag of potato chips multiplied by the number of children who receive
lunches under the program. A sophisticated cost-benefit analysis would take
account of other factors as well—for example, that it may be more
expensive to store and handle apples (which can bruise and rot) than bags of
potato chips, that their prices may fluctuate, and so on. Sometimes,
regulators overestimate costs because they fail to anticipate how new
technologies develop that reduce costs. 36 That said, cost estimates are
usually straightforward exercises in accounting and can take advantage of
data that industry, government, and academia have collected for their own
purposes.
By contrast, determining the monetary benefits of a regulation is
often difficult. 37 If children are given apples rather than potato chips, they
may throw away the apples rather than eat them. They may use pocket
money to get their carbohydrate fix from a vending machine or after school.
If some children eat apples, it is possible that the additional nutritional
benefit will, in fact, have zero or trivial health effects. So there is an initial
question whether the regulation will have the intended effect on behavior,
and a second question whether, even if it does, the effect will be positive.
And then a third question is how to measure positive effects. Sometimes,
this will be easy. If the school lunch program reduces the number of
children who become diabetic, then the avoided medical costs associated
with diabetes may be calculated. But other benefits may be real but hard to
value in monetary terms. Thinner children may enjoy enhanced self-esteem
and more energy, which may improve their studies; but all of these things
will be hard to put in monetary terms because there is no market in selfesteem or energy, and hence no market value for these things.
To sum up, let us distinguish between two sources of ambiguity in
the calculation of benefits. First, there is a causation problem, by which we
34

Thus, when we refer to CBA, we mean “formal” rather than “informal” CBA, where the
latter refers merely to the idea of balancing. See Sinden, supra note 29, at 99 (explaining
the differences between a formal, quantified CBA and an informal, qualitative CBA).
35
Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Nutrition Standards in the
National School Lunch and School Breakfast, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088 (2012).
36
Hart Hodges, Econ. Pol'y Inst., Falling Prices: Cost Of Complying With Environmental
Regulations Almost Always Less Than Advertised (1997); Thomas C. McGarity & Ruth
Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 Tex. L.
Rev. 1997, 2031 (2002).
37
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 30 at 1, 375-76 (2014) (explaining that quantifying
benefits is difficult because of epistemic problems, objections to standard economic
thinking about monetization, and incommensurability).
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mean empirical uncertainty as to whether a regulation will have intended
behavioral effects. Second, there is a monetization problem: certain benefits
are hard to monetize because no market exists in those benefits. Both
problems can tempt a regulator to argue that a regulation has unquantifiable
benefits.
B.

The Institutional Structure

Regulators derive their authority to regulate from statutes enacted by
Congress, but these statutes rarely direct regulators to use CBA. 38 Most
statutes provide general standards for improving public health or safety or
achieve other goals. 39 Courts have given regulators wide latitude to interpret
these statutes, and this has given them a great deal of freedom to choose the
stringency, scope, and method of regulation, as long as they provide an
adequate explanation for the regulation they choose. 40
Before the 1980s, some regulators informally used cost-benefit
analysis to justify regulations. 41 In 1981, President Reagan signed an
executive order that required most regulators to perform cost-benefit
analysis for major regulations (those having an economic impact of at least
$100 million per year). 42 The executive order was controversial at the time.
Many people believed that it erected bureaucratic hurdles for the purpose of
blocking or delaying needed regulations. 43 But all subsequent presidents,
including Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, extended Reagan’s CBA with
some modifications. 44 CBA now has adherents on both the left and right
who believe that it is a sensible, technocratic device for ensuring that
regulation is rational rather than arbitrary—though it remains
controversial. 45
Today, most regulators are required to perform CBAs and do so—in
the sense of doing the necessary calculations, or some of them, and
reporting the results—for all major regulations. They report their
38

But see Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. at 2,711 (holding that the Clean Air Act requires
EPA to consider costs, even if it need not necessarily conduct full-blown CBA).
39
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (providing that the Administrative shall regulate electric
utility steam generating units if the Administrator finds it “appropriate and necessary”).
40
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837
(1984).
41
Adler & Posner, supra, note 32, at 15.
42
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
43
Adler & Posner, supra, note 29, at 2-4.
44
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No.
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
45
For criticisms, see Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the
Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (2004).
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calculations in Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) that accompany the
regulations. 46 However, as we will see, they do not always quantify
benefits. And it is not clear that even when regulators do a proper CBA,
they follow it. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the executive
orders that require CBA are not legally enforceable. 47 Regulators are
required to submit proposed regulations along with associated CBAs to the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is in the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the White House, but OIRA,
OMB, and the president are free to waive or relax the CBA standard if they
wish to. 48 Second, at least some statutes either forbid regulators to use CBA
or make it difficult for them to do so because they impose specific
requirements on regulators. For example, when statutes tell a regulator to
reduce pollution below a specified quantitative threshold which is itself not
cost-justified, the regulator must do so, regardless of what its own CBA
may tell it. In this context, the executive order functions as a reporting
requirement; it does not supersede statutory language. Adding to the
confusion, courts sometimes disagree about when regulators must use CBA,
may use it, and cannot use it. 49
C.

The Debate on Unquantified Benefits

In a number of influential papers published in the 1980s and 1990s,
a group of scholars argued that many of the regulations issued by the U.S.
government failed cost-benefit analysis. 50 In several of these papers, the
scholars pointed out that agencies often justified regulations based on
46

See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4 (2003); Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatoryimpact-analysis-a-primer.pdf.
47
See In re Surface Min. Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1,346, 1,357 (D.C. Cir.1980)
(explaining that executive orders without specific foundation in congressional action are
not judicially enforceable in private civil suits).
48
Adler & Posner, supra at 80-87.
49
See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (holding that
EPA was permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in the face of an ambiguous statute).
50
See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 Regulation 25 (1986); Tammy O.
Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in LifeSaving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation 167
(Robert W. Hahn ed., Oxford University Press 1996); Robert W. Hahn, Reviving
Regulatory Reform: A Global Perspective 32 (AEI Press 2000); Robert W. Hahn,
Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in Risks, Costs, and
Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation 208 (Robert W. Hahn ed., Oxford
University Press 1996); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis
Improved Regulatory Decisions?, 22 Journal of Economic Perspectives 67 (2008).
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unquantified benefits. 51 If these unquantified benefits are assumed to be
zero, then the regulations were not cost-justified. The most recent study,
published in 2007, confirms that regulators frequently fail to full monetize
all the claimed benefits of regulations. 52
For example, in a well-known paper, Robert Hahn compiled a
database of 136 regulations. 53 Hahn assigned a zero benefit to dozens of
regulations because the agencies that issued them did not provide a
monetary value for the benefits. 54 The regulations included rules requiring
oil tankers to have double hulls, protecting agricultural workers from toxic
pesticides, and limiting toxic pollutants in drinking water. While it is
possible that the net benefit of these regulations were zero, it is hard to
believe that these rules did not produce any benefits, as Richard Parker has
pointed out. 55
Consider, for example, EPA’s 1995 municipal waste combustor
56
rule. The regulation was designed to reduce a range of dangerous
emissions—including particulate matter, acid gases, nitrogen oxide, dioxin,
cadmium, mercury, and lead. 57 However, EPA believed that it was possible
to assign valuations to reductions of only the first three substances. 58 While
it was known that dioxin, cadmium, mercury, and lead are dangerous when
ingested, EPA did not have data that permitted it to estimate monetized
benefits of reduced exposure to them. 59 For that reason, Hahn simply
disregarded the benefits of these rules. 60 Parker responds persuasively that it
would have been wrong for EPA to disregard these benefits because it is
clear that they are not zero. 61

51

See, e.g., Hahn & Dudley, supra.
Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit
Analysis?, 1 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 192 (2007).
53
Hahn did estimate benefits for some regulations for which the agency did not. See Robert
W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1,021, 1037 (2004).
54
See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?,
in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation 208 (Robert W.
Hahn ed., Oxford University Press 1996).
55
Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1,345, 1382 (2003).
56
Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines for
Existing Sources: Municipal Waste Combustors, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,387 (Dec. 19, 1995)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
57
Id at 65,387.
58
Id. at 65,387-388.
59
EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, supra
note 3, at E-S9.
60
See Hahn, supra note 51.
61
Parker, supra note 55, at 1,393-94.
52
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In response to Parker’s criticisms, Hahn argues that “there is no
simple alternative for filling gaps in an agency’s analysis.” 62 He continues:
In short, I think it is not unreasonable to assign a zero dollar value to
unquantified benefits and cost categories for three reasons. First, it
gives regulatory agencies an incentive to provide more information
on quantifiable benefits and costs. Second, any other assumption
seems totally arbitrary in the absence of information on the actual
non-quantified benefits and costs. Third, the measure of quantifiable
net benefit should be used in conjunction with nonquantifiable
benefits and costs to reach a decision. Exactly how is a matter of
some debate. 63
There are problems with each one of these responses. If it is expensive or
impossible for regulators to obtain adequate information, then there is no
point in giving them an incentive to do so. Moreover, as we will argue, the
assumption that unquantified benefits are worth zero is less justified than
using a subjective prior. Finally, the argument that a regulator may
disregard a cost-benefit analysis by citing unquantified benefits just gives
away the game. Hahn cannot claim that regulators acted wrongly if he
believes that they are permitted to do this.
Yet, there is some common ground between Parker and Hahn. In his
discussion of EPA’s municipal waste combustor rule, Parker says:
However, EPA shares a measure of blame for the omission. While
EPA devotes several pages to documenting the toxicity of heavy
metals and dioxins in the abstract, nowhere (not even in the twohundred-page Economic Impact Assessment buried in its docket
room) does EPA address the fundamental, priority-setting questions
facing risk managers in that rule: (1) Are current levels of emissions
of heavy metal and dioxin creating a significant human health or
ecosystem risk? (2) What portion of total emissions, and total risk
from emissions, is accounted for by hazardous waste combustors?
While it may be unfair (given data limitations) to ask for numbers in
response to these questions, surely courts, policymakers, and the
public are entitled to some explanation of why agency risk managers
deem emissions from waste combustors a significant risk. We are
left with a record that fails to fully prove the rationality of the rule. 64

62

Hahn, supra note 51, at 1,037.
Hahn, supra note 51, at 1,037-38.
64
Parker, supra note 55, at 1,394.
63
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So Parker agrees with Hahn that a regulator acts wrongly by failing to
disclose or compile relevant information about the expected effect of the
regulation on emissions and human health. But Parker’s statement is as
puzzling as Hahn’s. Suppose EPA stated that current emissions of heavy
metal and dioxin threaten human health “substantially” or “significantly.” Is
this sufficient? Affected parties would be justified in asking EPA why a
certain risk is substantial, and it is hard to see how EPA could answer this
question without quantifying the risk. Parker doesn’t seem to think EPA
should be required to provide “numbers,” but why not? And if the answer is
that there is not enough data, then what exactly did EPA do wrong in the
first place?
II. UNQUANTIFIED BENEFITS
We turn now to the practice of regulators. Our goal is to provide a
systematic analysis of unquantified benefits in cost-benefit analysis. In the
sections that follow, we examine the extent to which agencies fail to
quantify costs and benefits, the reasons they give for failing to do so, and
the extent to which agency practices differ. We then focus briefly on the
particular issue of unquantified costs.
A.

The Extent of Non-quantification

We collected every major regulation issued by every regulatory
agency from 2010 through 2013. 65 This included a total of 106 major rules,
promulgated by fourteen agencies, including some cases in which two
agencies worked in tandem. Agencies were able to fully quantify the
regulatory costs and benefits in only two of these 106 regulations. There
were 48 other regulations in which agencies were able to partially quantify
both costs and benefits, meaning that the agency calculated some (non-zero)
costs and benefits while nonetheless acknowledging that its calculations
were incomplete. In 56 of the regulations, the agency was unable to attach
any number to either costs or benefits (or both). Of those 56 regulations, 36
involved entirely unquantified benefits, 9 involved entirely unquantified
costs, and 11 involved both unquantified benefits and costs. Table 1
summarizes these findings.

65

A major regulation is defined by OMB as one that is expected to have an economic
impact in excess of $100 million. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4 (2003)
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Table 1: Regulations by Extent of Quantification of Benefits and Costs
Extent of Quantification
Number
Partly quantified costs and benefits
48
Did not quantify benefits
36
Did not quantify costs
9
Did not quantify benefits and costs
11
Fully quantified benefits and costs
2
Total
106

Those numbers, viewed in isolation, appear to paint a dire picture of
agency behavior. Agencies are operating despite a dearth of information,
and in many cases the uncertainty that surrounds their actions might be
causing (or allowing) them to regulate in ways that do not result in social
benefits. But the truth is not quite so troubling. In 44 of the 48 regulations
with partially quantified costs and benefits, the calculated benefits exceed
the costs. Only in four cases—three regulations promulgated by the
Department of Transportation, and one by the EPA—did an agency
promulgate a regulation where the known costs exceed the known
benefits. 66 And in three of these four cases, the agency issued the regulation
not because it believed that the regulation would be cost-justified if the
unquantified benefits were included, which is necessarily speculative, but
because the agency was obligated to regulate by statute.
The Department of Transportation’s 2013 regulation of Pilot
Certification and Qualification Requirements is illustrative. 67 The regulation
required all commercial airline pilots, including pilots who were second in
command of an airplane, to obtain an Airline Transport Pilot (“ATP”)
certificate that required 1500 hours of flying time. (Prior regulations had
only required that pilots in command of an airplane obtain such a
certificate.) The DOT admitted that the regulation would produce relatively
few safety benefits but significant costs, mainly to the pilots who were
forced to undergo additional training. It estimated that the regulation would

66

Positive Train Control Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,108 (Sept. 27, 2010) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 236); Pilot Certification and Air Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier
Operations, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,324 (July 15, 2013) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 121, 135,
141, and 142); EPA, Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida’s Lakes and Flowing
Waters, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,447 (2011); Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration, Automatic Dependent Surveillance— Broadcast (ADS–B) Out
Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, 75 Fed. Reg.
37711 (2010).
67
See Pilot Certification and Air Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations, 78
Fed. Reg. 42,324 (July 15, 2013) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 121, 135, 141, and 142).
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produce $19.7 million in benefits via avoided accidents. 68 The FAA
calculated the likely costs at $122 million, predominantly in the form of
additional expenditures (both time and money) by pilots seeking
certification. (There were some unquantified benefits, but the agency
believed them to be relatively small.) However, as the DOT explained, this
regulatory change was mandated by a federal statute—the Airline Safety
and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. 69 The agency
explained that the costs were “statutory costs” and noted that “the costs
associated with the requirement for [second in command pilots] to have an
ATP certificate are attributable to the statute, not to this regulation.” 70 The
agency’s hands were tied.
Another DOT regulation, this one governing railroad control
systems, was similarly mandated by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act
of 2008. 71 And a 2011 EPA regulation governing water quality in Florida
was initiated by a successful citizen suit against the EPA brought by
environmental groups. 72 In both cases, the agencies stated plainly that they
would not regulate absent these obligations.
The regulations without any quantifiable benefits offer a more
mixed picture. One important point is that regulations with unquantified
benefits were either relatively low-cost or compelled by statute. Recall that
there were 36 regulations in our sample for which an agency quantified at
least some costs but could not quantify any benefits. These regulations
averaged $158 million in costs (per regulation). 73 By comparison, the 48
regulations for which the EPA quantified both costs and benefits—and for
which benefits outweighed costs in nearly all cases—averaged nearly $765
million in costs (per regulation). In addition, among all of the regulations
with unquantified benefits, the two regulations with the greatest costs
involved implementations of the Affordable Care Act. One was a 2013
regulation that involved the administration of expanded Medicaid programs
and children’s health insurance; this regulation was expected to produce a
68

Id. at 42,359.
Id. at 42,364.
70
Id. at 42,326.
71
Positive Train Control Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,108 (Sept. 27, 2010) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 236).
72
40 CFR 131.10(b). That rule was later withdrawn when Florida promulgated its own
environmental regulations governing the same waterways. Water Quality Standards for the
State of Florida’s Lakes and Flowing Waters; Withdrawal, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,447 (Sept. 25,
2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
73
That figure excludes four regulations that had negative costs. When a regulation that is
no longer cost-benefit justified is repealed the agency typically records the benefits of
repeal as negative costs, rather than positive benefits. When those four regulations are
included, the average cost falls to $107 million.
69
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cost of slightly more than $1 billion. 74 The other was a 2012 regulation
dealing with the administration of federal and state insurance exchanges.
This regulation was expected to carry a cost of $552 million. 75 The
Department of Health and Human Services did not attempt to calculate the
regulatory benefits because it did not believe it could separate the benefits
of these particular regulations from the benefits of the Affordable Care Act
as a whole. 76 If just these two regulations are subtracted from the data set,
the average regulatory cost among the remaining 34 regulations falls to
approximately $115 million. 77
B.

Explanations for Non-Quantification

In more than 74% of the regulations in our data, the agency stated
that it could not quantify all of the relevant benefits or costs because of
empirical uncertainty—missing data, modeling difficulties, or other related
effects. There were only nine regulations in which the agency claimed that a
benefit or cost was not quantifiable as a matter of principle. Table 2
summarizes these statistics:
Table 2: Frequency of Agency Explanations for Failure to Quantify
Benefits and Costs
Explanation
Frequency
Empirical uncertainty
77
Benefit/cost is not quantifiable in 9
principle
Other
14
No explanation provided
10
*Note: numbers do not sum to 106 because in some cases an agency
provided multiple rationales.

74

Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: Essential Health Benefits in
Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and Appeal Processes, and
Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: Eligibility and Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160
(July 15, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447, and 457; and 45
C.F.R. pts. 155 and 156).
75
Department of Health and Human Services, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:
Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, Exchange Standards for
Employers and Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk Corridors and Risk Adjustment,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/hie3r-ria-032012.pdf (2012).
76
Id. at 37.
77
These two regulations were also mandated by statute, and the Department of Health and
Human Services had no choice but to promulgate them.
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Of the nine regulations for which the agency declared that the
benefit was unquantifiable in principle, six involved arguments by the
agency that the benefits included “values such as . . . equity, human dignity,
fairness, and distributive impacts” 78 that could not be quantified. Yet in all
of these cases, the agency expected the regulation to produce significant
market-related benefits that the agency could and should have calculated.
For instance, in 2011 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) promulgated a regulation that expanded the conditions under which
employees could be classified as disabled and receive reasonable
accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 79 The
regulation was expected to produce dignitary benefits to certain employees
who, the agency believed, would no longer face discrimination. 80 But those
were not the only benefits the agency expected the regulation to yield. In
addition, the EEOC speculated that employees who received
accommodations might become more productive, and that employers would
benefit by retaining employees who would otherwise quit. 81 One
commenter supplied dollar estimates of this benefit, citing research
indicating that reasonable accommodations could be worth between $1000
and $5,500 per worker. 82 Yet the agency did not attempt to quantify any of
these benefits or measure them against the costs. (We discuss this regulation
in greater detail below.)
Similarly, in 2013 the Department of Labor issued a regulation
prohibiting discrimination in employment against particular categories of
military veterans. 83 The agency invoked Executive Order 13,563 and
explained that its “analysis of the benefits of this proposal emphasizes the
non-monetary benefits,” including “values that are difficult or impossible to
quantify, including equity.” 84 Executive Order 13,563 does instruct
agencies to include benefits such as equity, human dignity, and fairness in
their analyses, even when those benefits are difficult or impossible to
quantify. However, the benefits that the DOL ascribes to this regulation are
78

See Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (March 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630).
80
Id. at 16,997.
81
Id. at 16,996-97.
82
Id. at 16,996.
83
Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and
Subcontractors Regarding Special Disabled Veterans, Veterans of the Vietnam Era,
Disabled Veterans, Recently Separated Veterans, Active Duty Wartime or Campaign
Badge Veterans, and Armed Forces Service Medal Veterans, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,614 (Sept.
24, 2013) (codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 60-250 and 60-300).
84
Id. at 58,656.
79
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straightforward. The DOL argued that the rule will “facilitate the
connection of job-seeking veterans with contractors looking to hire” and
that it “provides increased tools with which the contractor can assess its
affirmative action efforts.” 85 These benefits, and the few others listed, are
not the type of inchoate goods that the quoted language from Executive
Order 13,563 seemed to contemplate. To the contrary, they are labor market
advantages that the Department of Labor should have been able to quantify.
Yet the agency makes no effort to do so, instead concluding:
[The Department of Labor] believes that the final rule will have
extensive benefits for veterans who are prospective and current
employees of Federal contractors and Federal contractors. As such,
[the DOL] concludes that the benefits of the rule justify the costs. 86
Four other regulations followed the same template. 87
While it is tempting to argue that any regulation dealing with
disabled people or veterans must involve non-quantifiable benefits, we
believe that the agencies’ invocation of boilerplate language from Executive
Order 13,563 is precisely what must be avoided. Some benefits like human
dignity might well be monetizable, as we argue below. But even if they are
not, the agency should still conduct a cost-benefit analysis that takes into
account all the monetizable benefits. It should then separately state that the
regulation should be issued because of identified dignitary benefits, even if
it fails a cost-benefit analysis. With respect to equity and distributive
impacts, the agency should also conduct a cost-benefit analysis and explain
that the regulation should be issued because of the distributive impacts,
even though it fails a cost-benefit analysis.
Moreover, the analysis of distributive impacts should be rigorous
rather than conclusory. The DOL should have actually explained how the
rule would advance equity by estimating the impact of the rule on the
wealth on veterans. Such an estimate would not have been difficult to
provide. The DOL possesses information about the income and employment
85

Id.
Id.
87
See National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg.
37,106 (June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115); Medical Examination of Aliens—
Removal of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection From Definition of
Communicable Disease of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,547 (Nov. 2, 2009)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 34) (noting reduction in “stigma of HIV-infected persons”);
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75
Fed. Reg. 56,164 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35); Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
56,236 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36).
86
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rate of classes of veterans. 88 Indeed, according to this information veterans
have, on average, a higher employment rate and higher median income than
nonveterans do. 89 This strongly suggests that a program that generically
helps veterans may well have perverse distributive impacts unless it is
carefully designed to help veterans who are least well-off. If the DOL
cannot demonstrate that the distributive impacts are positive, then it should
not be able to cite distributive values as a reason for issuing the regulation.
In other cases, the regulations were promulgated to implement the
Affordable Care Act, and the agency explained that it was impossible—both
practically and as a matter of principle—to separate the benefits created by
the particular regulation at hand from the benefits of the larger statute. This
was the issue with respect to two regulations issued in 2013 by the
Department of Health and Human Services, one to establish guidelines for
coverage of essential health benefits 90 and another to set standards related to
the expansions of Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Programs. 91
The last case comes from a 2010 Department of the Treasury
regulation governing the manner in which agencies disburse benefits to
citizens. 92 The regulation required all individuals receiving benefits from
federal agencies to receive payment of those benefits via electronic funds
transfer—that is, direct deposit. Among the unquantifiable costs of this
regulation, the agency included “intangible emotional costs for individuals
who are fearful or resistant to direct deposit.” 93
We do not think that that these costs would be difficult to quantify.
There are numerous ways to determine how much an individual might value
not having to receive direct deposits. The agency might calculate how much
time and money the typical individual spends in order to use her preferred
non-direct method of deposit (mailing letters, going to the bank, etc.). (This

88

See Department of Labor, The Veteran Labor Force in the Recovery (2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/veteranslaborforce/.
89
Id. at 2.
90
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834 (Feb. 25, 2013) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, and 156).
91
Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: Essential Health Benefits in
Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and Appeal Processes, and
Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: Eligibility and Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160
(July 15, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447, and 457; and 45
C.F.R. pts. 155 and 156).
92
Management of Federal Agency Disbursements, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,315 (December 22,
2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 208).
93
Id. at 80,330.
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is a type of revealed preference analysis. 94) Alternatively, the agency might
simply ask people how much additional money they would need to be
offered to accept direct deposit in lieu of their current deposit method (a
stated preference approach). 95 The fact that the benefits are “emotional”
does not mean that they are unmeasurable. More plausibly, we suspect that
the agency simply believed that they were too small to be worth measuring;
the benefits themselves might be exceeded by the cost of performing a
study to calculate them. If this was its reason, the agency should have said
so.
In contrast to the few regulations where an agency claimed that a
particular benefit or cost was unquantifiable in principle, there are 77
regulations in our dataset in which an agency announces that it lacks the
empirical information necessary to make such a calculation. There are a
wide variety of types of unquantified benefits and costs across those
seventy-seven regulations, but an examination of the data reveals several
patterns.
First, in some cases it appears that the unquantified benefits could be
quite large. One example is a 2010 regulation issued by the Department of
the Interior imposing increased safety measures for deep-water oil and gas
drilling in the wake of the BP oil spill. 96 The only asserted benefit of the
new safety measures was the prevention of another catastrophic oil spill, but
the agency did not offer an estimate of these benefits. It noted that there had
been 4,123 deep water wells drilled but only one catastrophic spill (the BP
spill), and so it estimated the probability of a catastrophic spill at 1 in 4,123
for any new well that is being drilled. 97 (This raises the question of why the
agency was not considering the benefits of avoiding non-catastrophic spills
as well.) However, the agency could not estimate the reduced probability of
such a spill from the safety measures it was implementing. It noted a
Canadian Energy Board study that estimated risk reductions from similar
(though not identical) safety measures, but then announced that it lacked
“sufficient data that would allow adapting that methodology to the change

94

See Eric P. Kroes & Robert J. Sheldon, Stated Preference Methods: An Introduction, 22
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 12-16 (1988) (explaining the difference
between stated preference methods and revealed preferences); see also Paul A. Samuelson,
Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 Economica 61 (1948).
95
See Kroes & Sheldon, supra note 94, at 12-16.
96
Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Increased Safety
Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,346
(October 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
97
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Benefit-Cost
Analysis for the Interim Final Rule on Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development
on the Outer Continental Shelf 1, 22 (2010).
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in the probability of blowout associated with . . . this rulemaking.” 98 In
addition to its inability to calculate the reduced probability of a spill, the
agency did not estimate the economic benefits of avoiding a spill. 99
Second, when agencies are unable to fully calculate a benefit, they
almost never produce all of the information available to them and hazard a
best guess. In the vast majority of cases, the agency will simply announce
that the benefit cannot be calculated, explain the reason, and provide no
further information. The Department of Interior’s regulation of offshore oil
drilling safety provides one example of this: after concluding that it could
not estimate the marginal safety benefit of the regulation, the agency did not
provide an estimate of the benefit of preventing such a spill. 100
The efforts by various agencies to regulate the emission of mercury
and mercury compounds are similarly illustrative. In 2011, the Department
of Energy promulgated a trio of regulations setting energy efficiency
standards for air conditioners, furnaces, refrigerators, clothes dryers, and
other home appliances. 101 Higher-efficiency appliances use less energy and
reduce the burning of fossil fuels needed to produce that energy. The
agency’s cost-benefit analysis thus includes reductions in pollution due to
electrical power generation. These pollutants include carbon dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, and mercury. The Department of Energy calculated the
monetary value of the reduction in carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emissions, but it could not calculate the monetary value of the reduction in
mercury emissions. 102 The DOE was able to estimate the reduction in
emissions—for instance, the regulation governing clothes dryers and air
98

Id. at 19.
There is no indication why the agency did not try. As of February 2013, the costs to BP
from its catastrophic oil spill totaled $42.2 billion. Because BP was being forced to
internalize the costs of the spill to the extent possible, this seems a reasonable estimate of
the total economic impact of the event. See Augustino Fontevecchia, BP Fighting A Two
Front War As Macondo Continues To Bite And Production Drops, Forbes, Feb. 5, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2013/02/05/bp-fighting-a-two-front-war-asmacondo-continues-to-bite-and-production-drops/.
100
See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Benefit-Cost
Analysis for the Interim Final Rule on Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development
on the Outer Continental Shelf, supra note 97, at 19.
101
Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Clothes
Dryers and Room Air Conditioners, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,454 (April 21, 2011) (to be codified at
10 C.F.R. pt. 430); Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
Residential Furnaces and Residential Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps, 76 Fed.
Reg. 67,037 (October 31, 2011) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R pt. 430); Energy Conservation
Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Refrigerators, RefrigeratorFreezers, and Freezers, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,516 (September 15, 2011) (to be codified at 10
C.F.R. pt. 430).
102
Department
of
Energy,
Appliance
Standards
1-2,
available
at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/pdfs/refrig_finalrule_tsd.pdf.
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conditioners would reduce mercury emissions by 0.073 tons. 103 However, it
provided no information beyond that figure. The DOE explained in a
footnote that it was “aware of multiple agency efforts to determine the
appropriate range of values used in evaluating the potential economic
benefits reduced Hg emissions.” However, it had “decided to await further
guidance regarding consistent valuation and reporting of Hg emissions
before it once again monetizes Hg emissions reductions in its
rulemakings.” 104 The Department of Energy did not provide any
preliminary results from these studies; it did not offer a guess or a rough
estimate as to the eventual outcome of these studies; it did not even name
the agencies involved in these efforts to quantify mercury benefits.
The following year, the EPA promulgated the mercury regulation
we described in the introduction. 105 This regulation was directed at mercury
emissions in particular. By this point, the EPA had assembled some data on
the benefits of limiting mercury emissions, but that data was very sparse.
The EPA had estimated only the neurologic benefits (avoiding loss of IQ) to
children who were exposed to mercury through “recreationally caught
freshwater fish.” 106 The EPA could not quantify other neurologic effects
(effects on memory, for instance); other non-neurologic health effects such
as improved cardiovascular health; decreased mortality from mercury
toxicity; or even benefits to children who were exposed to mercury through
channels other than recreationally caught freshwater fish. 107 It also did not
estimate the monetary value of environmental benefits that did not directly
impact human life or health. 108 Like the DOE regulations from the previous
year, the EPA did not venture any guesses—or offer any additional
information—regarding the benefits that are not fully quantified. 109
103

Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Clothes
Dryers and Room Air Conditioners, 76 Fed. Reg. at 22,457.
104
Id. at 22,457 n.3.
105
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-FuelFired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small IndustrialCommercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (February 16, 2012)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63).
106
EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards,
supra note 3, at ES-1.
107
Id. at ES-11.
108
Id. at ES-12.
109
EPA’s treatment of the benefits from mercury have become a major legal issue for the
agency. A number of state and private petitioners have challenged the EPA’s rule, arguing
that the agency should have considered that the rule’s costs dramatically outweigh its
benefits. EPA estimated that the annual costs of the rule would be $9.6 billion and the
benefits of mercury reduction would be only $0.005 billion. The EPA estimated that the
rule would produce approximately $53 billion in total benefits, the vast majority of which
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The third pattern that emerges from the regulations is that agencies
often justify their failure to quantify benefits based on lack of data even
though agencies could fund studies to collect that data. One example is a
2013 Health and Human Services regulation on the labeling of gluten-free
foods. 110 The primary benefit of the regulation was that it would aid people
with celiac disease in selecting and consuming gluten-free foods. However,
the agency was not able to fully quantify the benefits of the regulation—and
there was significant uncertainty surrounding the benefits it did quantify—
because it had no data on what fraction of food eaten by a typical person
with celiac disease is labeled as gluten-free. 111 (If the consumer is not
paying attention to the label, the regulation is irrelevant.) If the typical
consumer eats a high proportion of foods labeled gluten-free, the
regulation—which would clarify and enforce those standards—might have
significant benefits. If consumers eat only a small fraction of such foods,
the regulation would produce only meager benefits. HHS explained that it
could only guess at this number because no studies existed. 112 But the
agency could have conducted its own survey of consumer behavior, and in
fact the agency had conducted many other similar surveys of related
consumer behavior for this and other regulations. 113
Another example is a 2013 regulation by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) governing the rules that individuals must follow
when obtaining a visa. 114 Prior to this regulation, non-citizens living in the
United States were obligated to leave the U.S. while waiting for their visas
to be processed or renewed. The DHS regulation changed the rule to allow
non-citizens to remain in the country pending the processing of their visas,
so long as the non-citizen was living with immediate relatives who were
themselves American citizens. 115 The regulation’s benefit was in avoiding
the disruption—emotional and financial—to the visa applicant’s U.S.
relatives if the applicant was forced to live abroad while waiting while
waiting for her visa. However, the agency claimed that it could not quantify
this benefit because it was “currently unable to estimate the average
were attributable to reductions in particulate matter emissions. But because the rule is
targeted at mercury emissions in particular, petitioners have argued that the benefit/cost
ratio for mercury is of special importance. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. at 12,699.
110
Food Labeling; Gluten-Free Labeling of Foods, 78 Fed. Reg. 47,154 (Aug. 5, 2013)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
111
Id. at 47,156.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 47,158.
114
Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate
Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 536 (January 3, 2013) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103 and 212).
115
Id.
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duration of time an immediate relative must spend abroad while awaiting
waiver adjudication under the current process.” 116 This strikes us as
implausible; does DHS not keep statistics on its average visa processing
time? And even if such statistics were not available, couldn’t the agency
have conducted a short survey or study to determine the average wait time?
Finally, there were a number of regulations in which the agency
calculated the number of lives the regulation would save but could not
quantify the regulation’s morbidity benefits—the value of avoiding nonfatal diseases and other medical conditions. 117 This continues a trend we
observed in prior work. 118 There, we found that agencies—including the
EPA and OSHA—regularly claim to be unable to quantify non-fatal
regulatory health benefits such as prevented cases of bronchitis,
emphysema, and asthma. It is strange that agencies attach valuations to loss
of life but not to illness, especially given that studies quantifying the costs
of non-fatal diseases and health conditions certainly exist. 119 If agencies
have some reason for ignoring these studies or distrusting their findings,
they have not explained that reason.
C.

Agency-By-Agency Data

Our data also reveal significant differences between agencies in the
extent to which they quantify benefits and costs. Seven different agencies
are responsible for the 50 regulations promulgated between 2010 and 2013
in which the agency was able to fully or partially quantify both costs and
benefits. However, the agencies differ widely in their contributions to this
total. The EPA (13 regulations), Department of Energy (10 regulations), and
Department of Transportation (13 regulations, including 3 issued jointly
with the EPA) together account for 35 of the 50 regulations (70%) in our
data. By contrast, there were twelve agencies that produced at least one
regulation in which either benefits or costs (or both) could not be quantified
at all. (Again, there were a total of 56 such regulations.) Here too our data
are dominated by a few agencies. The Department of Health and Human
Services produced 22 regulations in which either costs or benefits could not
116

Id. at 574.
See, e.g., Department of Energy, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
Standards for Residential Clothes Washers, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,308 (2012) (calculating
benefits from reduced pollution-related deaths because of greater energy efficiency but
ignoring morbidity benefits).
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Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev.
657 (2010).
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See, e.g., Nattavudh Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different Price Tags
on the Same Health Condition: Re-evaluating the Well-Being Valuation Approach, 30 J.
Health Econ. 1,032, 1,038 tbl.3 (2011).
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be quantified, including 6 that were promulgated jointly with the
Department of Labor. The Department of the Interior was responsible for 10
more, and in combination the two agencies represent 32 of the 56
regulations (57%) of the regulations in our data.
In Table 3 below, we categorize each rule by the agency
promulgating the rule and the extent to which the agency quantified the
benefits and costs involved.
Table 3: Regulations by Agency and Degree of Quantification
Agency

Agriculture
Education
EEOC
Energy
EPA
EPA
&
Transportation
Health
and
Human
Services
HHS, Labor,
and Treasury
Homeland
Security
Housing and
Urban
Development
Interior
Justice
Labor
Office
of
Personnel
Management
Transportation
Treasury
Total:

Number of Regulations
Fully
Partially
quantified quantified
benefits
benefits
and costs
and costs

No
quantified
benefits

No
quantified
costs

No
quantified
benefits
or costs

4
2
1
10
13

3

3

11

5

5

1

3
1

5

1

1
1

3
4

2
1
4

8

1
1

9

2

48

1
36

1
9

1
11

What accounts for the broad discrepancies in agency-by-agency
practices? In part they are an artifact of the types of regulations the agencies
are promulgating and the statutes under which the agencies are operating.
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For instance, the Department of Health and Human Services had to
promulgate a number of regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act,
and as we noted above the costs and benefits of such regulations are
difficult or impossible to calculate separate from the statutes themselves.
Similarly, as we explained above, several of the Department of Labor’s
regulations implement employment anti-discrimination rules (as does the
EEOC’s lone regulation), and these regulations produce dignity- and equityrelated benefits that agencies find especially difficult to quantify.
In other cases, however, there appear to be significant differences
among agencies in their facility with cost-benefit analysis and access to
necessary data and modeling. For instance, the Department of Energy,
Department of Transportation, and EPA have long employed cost-benefit
analysis and have accumulated a significant quantity of data (and developed
a broad set of useful models). This is particularly the case with respect to
regulations that affect the burning of fossil fuels, which have by this point
been well-studied. 120 Even when an agency cannot quantify all of the effects
of a particular regulation—as with the EPA’s non-quantification of harms
from mercury exposure—it is often capable of quantifying a significant
proportion of them.
Other agencies, by contrast, appear to be relative novices at costbenefit analysis. The Department of Agriculture promulgated four
regulations in our sample, and it quantified benefits for none of them. The
benefits from these regulations are not obscure, either. Two of the
regulations set school lunch nutrition standards and were expected to
provide benefits by improving children’s health. 121 Another regulation
mandated country-of-origin labeling on food, which would provide
consumers with additional purchasing information. 122 Not only do the
benefits of such labels seem eminently quantifiable, there are existing
studies assessing U.S. consumer willingness to pay for country-of-origin
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See, e.g., Department of Energy, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
Standards for Residential Clothes Washers, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,308 (2012) (describing
extensive EPA and DOE research on harm from emissions).
121
Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Nutrition Standards in the
National School Lunch and School Breakfast, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088 (2012); Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, National School Lunch Program and School
Breakfast Program: Nutrition Standards for All Foods Sold in School as Required by the
Healthy, HungerFree Kids Act of 2010, Fed. Reg. 39,068 (2013).
122
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Mandatory Country of
Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and
Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia
Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,367 (2013).
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labels. 123 The fourth regulation was directed internally, at the U.S. Farm
Service Agency, and relaxed the terms under which that sub-agency is
required to purchase sugar from U.S. farmers. 124 The regulation is expected
to produce cost savings both for the federal government and for biofuel
producers. Despite the fact that these benefits would seem straightforward
to quantify, the agency was unable to put a number on them.
The obvious normative conclusion is that the lagging agencies
should adopt the cost-benefit practices of the leading agencies, such that
they are all equally proficient at CBA. OIRA would seem ideally positioned
to perform this type of centralizing function and educate agencies in the
practice of CBA. 125 The economists at OIRA could also aid agencies in
gathering and analyzing the data necessary for CBA where those data do
not already exist. There is no reason why agencies such as the Department
of Agriculture should be failing to quantify costs and benefits that other
agencies calculate as a matter of course.
D.

Unquantified Costs

To this point we have largely described unquantified regulatory
benefits. Unquantified costs call for separate treatment because of their
potential to hide (or facilitate) regulatory abuse. There is no easier way to
coerce an unjustified regulation into passing cost-benefit analysis than
failing to quantify some of the crucial costs.
As Table 1 indicates, there are only 9 regulations in our data in
which an agency quantified some benefits but entirely failed to quantify
costs, in comparison to 36 regulations in which an agency quantified costs
but not benefits. (There were 11 regulations in which an agency did not
quantify either.) Of the 48 regulations in which an agency partially
quantified both benefits and costs—meaning that it assigned a non-zero
number to each—the agency left some costs unquantified in 28 cases.
Yet few regulations in our data set involved unquantified costs of
any great magnitude. In part this is because costs are typically easier to
measure than benefits—if a factory must install some new type of pollutionreducing scrubber, the agency can simply compute the cost of installing the
123

See Wendy J. Umberger, Will Consumers Pay a Premium for Country-of-Origin
Labeled Meat?, CHOICES, 2004, http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2004-4/cool/2004-404.htm (2004).
124
Sugar Program; Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy Producers, 78 Fed. Reg.
45,441 (July 29, 2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1435).
125
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the federal government’s
central authority for reviewing executive branch regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,866,
48 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21,
2011).
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scrubber. Costs often take the form of goods that are priced on markets,
while benefits often do not. 126 In addition, regulated entities themselves are
often the source for information regarding regulatory costs, and they have
incentives to produce information about those costs. 127 If an agency fails to
quantify a cost, and a regulated entity submits a comment supplying an
estimate of that cost (and arguing that the regulation is not cost-benefit
justified), the regulation is not likely to survive judicial review if the agency
fails to take the cost into account. 128 In the majority of cases, the
unquantified costs were the administrative costs of implementing or
adhering to some new regulatory scheme—and often administrative costs
that would be borne by the agency itself. These costs are surely non-zero,
but we suspect that they are unlikely to fall within an order of magnitude of
the other economic effects of the regulation. (Recall that we are only
analyzing “significant” regulations with economic impacts of $100 million
or more.) Nonetheless, it is surprising that so many agencies in our data
failed to quantify administrative costs, given that agencies are no strangers
to quantifying the costs of administrative paperwork and have done so many
times. 129
The other unquantified costs are a hodgepodge of relatively smallticket items. For instance, two 2013 Department of the Interior regulations
governing migratory bird hunting listed lost state revenue from not being
able to sell additional hunting licenses as the primary unquantified costs. 130
The EEOC regulation implementing aspects of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, which we discussed earlier, names the possibility of
increased litigation—to enforce the terms of the regulation—as a possible
unquantified cost. 131 We also previously described the Treasury regulation
126

Of course, this is partly because agencies do not count unemployment as a regulatory
cost. We have argued elsewhere that they should do so. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A.
Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 Va. L. Rev. 579 (2012).
127
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1580 (2002).
128
The regulation could conceivably be struck down on two separate grounds: as arbitrary
and capricious under APA 5 U.S.C. § 706 and for failing to respond to a comment under
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
129
See Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 Duke L.J. (forthcoming
2015).
130
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Migratory Bird Hunting; Early
Seasons and Bag and Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds in the
Contiguous United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands 78 Fed.
Reg. 53,200 (2013); Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Migratory Bird
Hunting; Late Seasons and Bag and Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds,
78 Fed. Reg. 58,204 (2013).
131
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,978.
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requiring direct deposit, which would impose emotional costs on federal
benefits recipients who are adverse to direct deposit. 132 The EPA lists
“some employment costs” among the unquantified costs of a 2011 CrossState Air Pollution Rule. 133 We have argued elsewhere that agencies should
take unemployment costs into account when performing cost-benefit
analysis, 134 though even significant unemployment effects would not likely
put a dent in this particular rule—the EPA projected over $40 billion in
quantified benefits and only $691 million in quantified costs. 135 Finally, at
least one regulation includes unquantified costs that may not actually be
costs. In 2011, the Department of Labor promulgated a regulation
mandating greater disclosure of pension plan fees to participants in the
plan. 136 The DOL states that it cannot quantify the costs that would accrue if
some employers responded to the regulation by declining to offer pension
plans. If employers drop their pension plans because of the administrative
burden imposed by the regulation, that is truly a cost. But if a plan is
dropped because participation falls once employees realize the fees they are
being asked to pay, then this may represent a social benefit instead.
In the end, we cannot know whether agencies have hidden major
costs under the heading of “unquantified” or even failed to name them at
all. After all, if a regulation causes unemployment, it is possible that it
harms people’s dignity and produces negative distributive effects. If these
effects should be taken into account as arguments for regulation, they
should be taken into account as argument against regulation as well. But our
regulatory survey has failed to unearth promising candidates. Given the
often adversarial backdrop to agency rulemaking, this does not come as a
significant surprise. If agencies are erring by omission and using the lack of
quantification to advance suspect regulation, it is more likely to be
occurring on the benefits side.
Further, it is important to note that we are able to observe only those
regulations that agencies have decided to promulgate, not proposed or
contemplated regulations that were rejected. There may be many instances
in which an agency does not proceed with a regulation because it has not
bothered to calculate all of the benefits that regulation will provide. Indeed,
Victor Gilinsky, a former commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory
132

Management of Federal Agency Disbursements, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,315
Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone in 27 States; Correction of SIP Approvals for 22 States, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208
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Commission (NRC), explained to us that the NRC was previously thought
to “stack the deck” against regulation by refusing to quantify benefits other
than effects on human health. 137 We cannot verify this statement, and we
cannot observe agency actions that do not occur. Nevertheless, it is
suggestive of the idea that the failure to quantify benefits might be leading
in some circumstances to under-regulation of significant harms.
III. BAYESIAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An argument can be made that regulators do not use cost-benefit
analysis properly because they rely heavily on unquantified benefits in
order to justify regulations. As we discussed in Part II, it is possible that
regulators claim unquantified benefits in order to rationalize bad regulations
that they seek to issue for ideological or political reasons. However, it is
also possible that their behavior is, at least roughly, normatively defensible.
We sketch below this normative argument, and show that if it is correct, it
nonetheless requires significant reform of agency practice.
A.

“Naïve” Versus Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis

Imagine that a factory begins to use substance X in its production
process, as a result of which workers are exposed to a small quantity of it.
Substance X is known to produce cancer in rats who are forced to consume
vast amounts of it. There is also anecdotal evidence that some human beings
who have been exposed to X later developed cancer, although it is not
known whether the exposure caused the cancer. No epidemiological studies
of X have been performed, in part because until now X has rarely been used
in manufacturing or any other common process. Some workers in the
factory complain that they have suffered headaches ever since X was
introduced.
A staff member at OSHA recommends that all factories that use X
be required to supply ventilation masks to their workers, which would cost
$1 million. An economist at OIRA argues that such a regulation would fail
a cost-benefit analysis because the benefits of the regulation are $0.
We regard such an argument as naïve—and we call the cost-benefit
analysis, such as it is, a “naïve cost-benefit analysis”—because it ignores
information about the lab rats, the anecdotes, and the worker complaints.
More precisely, it ignores the “prior” of the staff member. Inspired by
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Comment of Victor Gilinsky, Former Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, University of Chicago Conference on Federal Agency Decision-Making
Under Deep Uncertainty (May 8, 2015) (notes on file with author).
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Bayes’ rule, we argue that this is the wrong approach. 138 Imagine that the
staff member has worked at OSHA for decades, and over the years has
developed an intuitive sense of when chemical substances are dangerous
and when they are not. Perhaps, the staff member has learned from
experience that substances frequently thought to be safe have turned out to
be dangerous. Or perhaps, she recognizes that substances with certain telltale characteristics often turn out to be dangerous, and X shares those
characteristics. The staff member may not even be able to articulate her
reasons for believing that X is dangerous, but nonetheless she believes that
it is (though she is not certain).
The staff member has what is known in Bayesian statistics as a
“prior”—an estimate as to the value of some unknown number. 139 This
Bayesian prior is more than just a random guess. It is the product of the
regulator’s experience and intuition, which provides useful information.
The OIRA economist may be right that the regulation should not be issued,
but she is wrong to claim that the benefits of the regulation are $0. If the
regulator’s beliefs are sincere, the benefit of the regulation is likely greater
than $0. The problem is that the regulator has not articulated her
assumptions. If the regulator does not make her assumptions explicit, they
cannot be tested or updated.
Let us suppose that we force to her to. Imagine that the regulator
finally says that she believes that 100 workers will be exposed to the
chemical over a certain period of time. She thinks there is a one percent
probability that a worker will develop cancer and die. She also believes that
on average half the workers will develop 10 headaches per year as a result
of exposure. After some further thought, she thinks that the workers would
be willing to pay $20 to avoid the headaches. Accordingly, she calculates
the benefit of the regulation as $6,010,000, assuming a valuation of
statistical life of $6 million, and ignoring discounting. Based on this
calculation, the regulation passes a cost-benefit analysis.
Is the number spurious, no better than any other? We do not think
so—the number is the product of the regulator’s latent knowledge and
expertise. Moreover, the mandate to estimate numbers—even if they are
little more than guesses—has important institutional value because the
numbers provide a basis for evaluating the regulators’ reliability as
138

Bayes’ rule is a formula for updating the probability of an event as new information
becomes available about it. In practice, Bayesian reasoning assumes that probability
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(unpublished
manuscript
2007),
at
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See id. at 4 (describing and explaining Bayesian statistics).
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additional information is disclosed later on. In addition, the numbers also
provide a basis for revisions in light of additional information. Once a
regulatory agency has relied upon a prior, the agency should update that
prior in light of new information, just as Bayes’ Rule would dictate. 140 The
updated estimates would then be used in future regulations or even to revise
the original regulation. The crucial difference from current practice is that
agencies would no longer price benefits and harms at $0 when they lacked
complete statistical information. They would offer their best estimates, act
on those estimates, and then update the estimates over time. We will discuss
the process of updating in greater detail below.
Naïveté can go in the other direction as well. Imagine that the
factory decides to use substance Y instead. Substance Y is widely believed
to be completely harmless. But one day a respected epidemiologist
publishes a study that finds that Y is associated with a dangerous form of
cancer. The relationship between Y and cancer is statistically significant at
the five percent level. The economist at OSHA accordingly recommends
that the agency issue a regulation that limits exposure of workers to Y.
However, such a cost-benefit analysis would be naïve. The reason is that if
OSHA has a strong prior that Y is harmless, then there is a good chance that
the relationship found in the study is spurious. After all, one out of twenty
such studies will be wrong; there is also reason to believe that scientists are
biased toward publishing studies with statistically significant results. 141 If
the staffer has a strong enough prior that Y is harmless, then it may be
reasonable to believe that this particular study is one of the wrong ones.
Naïveté can also affect the cost side. Environmentalists have
complained that when regulators conduct cost-benefit analyses, they
typically rely on industry data in order to determine costs. 142 Industry data
is backward-looking and so does not take into account that the cost of
complying with a regulation—buying and installing scrubbers, for
example—is likely to decline in the future. 143 The producers of scrubbers
may benefit from economies of scale or technological development as they
respond to increased demand driven by regulatory requirements. With this
information, regulators should apply a discount to cost estimates derived
from industry data.
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Id. at 5 (describing the process of updating).
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We can summarize these comments by distinguishing between costbenefit analysis as a procedure and its inputs. As a procedure, cost-benefit
analysis merely directs regulators to issue regulations if the benefits exceed
the costs. The procedure itself does not direct regulators to use only certain
types of informational inputs such as peer-reviewed studies. Regulators
should use all relevant informational inputs when they conduct cost-benefit
analyses, subject to some qualifications that we discuss below. This means
that the regulator’s prior should be used rather than disregarded.
B.

Responses

We can imagine a number of responses to our argument. The first is
that the regulator’s prior is arbitrary; it has no basis in fact. If the prior is
arbitrary, then it should not be used, and instead the regulator should
assume that any possible effect that cannot be verified by scientific studies
has a probability of 0. 144
The problem with this argument is that the 0 probability is even
more arbitrary than the regulator’s prior. Consider the risk that
commercialization of drones would cause harm because some people would
use drones to spy on strangers in their homes. 145 The risk of this harm
clearly cannot be established with a scientific study. We don’t know how
often drones would be used in this way; and we don’t know how to
monetize the privacy invasion. Yet it is clear that the risk and the harm are
greater than zero. Accordingly, the regulator’s prior would be greater than 0
and it would be arbitrary and wrong to treat the expected harm as zero. The
regulator should be forced to quantify the expected harm with the
understanding that a very wide range of valuations would be reasonable.
Second, one could argue that there are tiny risks on both sides of the
cost-benefit analysis, and so it is reasonable to treat them as offsetting. In
the case of drones, for example, people who use drones might, while spying
on strangers, discover someone who is having a heart attack and call an
ambulance, saving that person’s life. The tiny probability of this benefit
offsets the tiny probability of harm from spying, and thus we should just
treaty both probabilities as zero.
This argument is also wrong. If both probabilities are very low, then
they will not affect the cost-benefit analysis, and in that sense the critic is
right that it would be harmless to treat both probabilities as zero. But there
is independent value in forcing the regulator to make explicit her
assumptions. After the regulation has been in place for a while, we will
144
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learn whether the regulator’s priors were accurate or not. That provides
important information about the reliability of the regulator. In addition, the
prior will continue to play a role as the regulator determines posterior
probabilities in the light of new information. If the regulator is able to
collect information about ambulance-calling but not about spying, then the
regulator will be able to update its probability estimates about ambulancecalling, but it should maintain its prior about spying.
A third worry is that if regulators are allowed to rely on their
subjective priors, then they will be able to rationalize regulations that they
seek to implement for improper reasons. Imagine that the head of EPA
holds a much more extreme view of environmental protection than could be
justified by statutory law or public opinion. Or consider the possibility that
the head of OSHA might try to limit workplace protections in order to
cultivate relationships with political allies in the business world. EPA might
choose to value headaches at $100 or $1000 rather than $20, while OHSA
might value than at $1 or 1 cent. In this way, the agencies could engineer
cost-benefit analyses that rationalize regulations chosen for other reasons.
While this concern is a legitimate one, the proper response is not to
ban regulators from relying on their priors or to force them to assign zero
value to hard-to-quantify benefits or costs. From a Bayesian perspective,
such a ban would make no sense: people cannot avoid relying on their
priors. As we argue below, when courts or OIRA have a good reason for
believing that an agency is biased, then they should be skeptical of the
agency’s work product—all of the work product, not just the unquantified
benefits. But often they will not have such a reason.
A fourth concern is that if agencies can justify a regulation on the
basis of unquantified benefits, then regulators will be lazy. 146 It is nearly
always the case that when a regulation is first considered, the potential
benefits are not yet quantified. The regulator must decide whether to
commission studies to quantify those benefits or not. A budget-constrained
regulator may be tempted to claim that some benefits are unquantifiable so
as to avoid having to fund a study. But if regulators were allowed to do this,
then frequently regulations will be approved that are not cost-justified.
However, banning regulators from relying on unquantified benefits
is too extreme a response to this problem. Instead, OIRA, courts, and other
reviewers should demand a good explanation for why benefits are
unquantifiable. And when regulators articulate their priors by stating their
assumptions, this will impose self-discipline on them and make it difficult
to exaggerate the costs of doing additional studies.
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C.

Institutional Responses to Regulatory Uncertainty

If our argument is correct, then the regulatory system should not
avoid using priors but instead should institutionalize them. By this we mean
that agencies should be permitted to rely on priors, but processes should be
in place to ensure that agencies do not abuse their power to do so. We
suggest the following reforms.
First, while regulators should be permitted to rely on priors, they
should be forced to articulate them. Accordingly, regulators should not be
permitted to justify a regulation that otherwise fails a (quantified) costbenefit analysis by appealing to “unquantified benefits.” Instead, regulators
should identify the unquantified benefits and then publish an estimate of
what they are. For example, if regulators believe that emission of a
chemical substance will cause headaches, they should publish estimates of
the population exposed to the chemical substance, the fraction they believe
to be susceptible to headaches, and a valuation for an avoided headache.
The regulator should be allowed to rely on pure guesswork or intuition
except to the extent that some elements of this calculation (such as the
population that is exposed) can be verified empirically. The regulator must
be clear that it is guessing—that is, relying on a prior.
Second, regulators should be required to provide for an institutional
mechanism for updating their priors. One such mechanism would be a
requirement in the regulation itself that the regulator revisit its assumptions
about unquantified benefits in the future—say, in one year or five years.
The regulator would further be required to publish a statement in which it
confirms or modifies the assumptions behind the prior. The regulator will
be permitted to update the prior as long as it provides reasons.
Alternatively, regulators could put in place mechanisms for reviewing the
priors for all regulations, rather than provide for such mechanisms in each
regulation.
Third, from time to time OIRA should evaluate the accuracy of the
priors used by regulators in their regulations. If priors are frequently
revised, this is evidence that the regulator does not have very good
intuitions about the hard-to-quantify benefits of regulations within its
expertise, or that regulators act in a political or ideological fashion
(especially, if the revisions occur across administrations). OIRA might give
less deference to the priors of agencies that frequently revise them.
Fourth, OIRA should also examine cases where different regulators
give different valuations to the same types of benefits. Suppose that EPA
and OSHA offer different valuations for avoided headaches, based on their
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priors. OIRA might then convene an interagency group that funds empirical
analysis to help resolve the inconsistency. 147
To illustrate the effects of this reform, let’s consider again the
school lunch regulation. Recall that the regulator disclosed the costs of the
regulation but said the benefits—improved nutrition for schoolchildren—
were unquantifiable. 148 Under our approach, the regulator would be
required to provide estimates (in some cases, guesses) of the following
numbers: (1) the number of children who would consume this new lunch,
taking into the account that some children might throw out a lunch that does
not taste good; (2) the nutritional effect of the new lunch, taking into
account that this may vary across body types, demographic groups, and so
on, meaning that the regulator would also need to rely on demographic and
related information if it is available, and to make guesses if not; (3) the
health effect of the improved nutrition, again taking into account differences
across body types, demographic groups, and so on; and (4) the monetary
value of the health effect, for example, in terms of avoided medical costs.
It is important to observe that the calculation of the benefits of the
lunch regulation would be based on a range of types of information—some
of it easily quantified, others of it not. For example, the regulator will be
able to start with basic demographic information that is probably already in
its possession or is otherwise easily available. However, the regulator will
only be able to guess about the effect of improved nutrition on life
expectancy, health, self-esteem, and so on. We would permit the regulator
to make those guesses; our only requirement is that it quantify them.
Next, the regulator must issue a plan that explains how it plans to
test its assumptions. At one extreme, the regulator might implement a
randomized trial by mandating the new lunches for some children and not
others. But randomized trials are expensive and not always practical.
Another approach is to plan to conduct surveys of schools and families, in
order to find out whether children throw out lunches or eat them, and of
doctors, who might be asked to report if obese children in the program lose
weight. All of this information can then be used at a later time to evaluate
the regulators’ initial assumptions.
When the review period arrives, we might discover, for example,
that the regulator over- or underestimated the number of children who
would throw out lunches. If so, in deciding whether to renew the regulation,
147

This is already done from time to time, as illustrated by the establishment of the
Interagency
Working
Group
on
Social
Cost
of
Carbon,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-ofCarbon-for-RIA.pdf.
148
Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Nutrition Standards in the
National School Lunch and School Breakfast, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4097 (2012).

35

UNQUANTIFIED BENEFITS

the regulator would be required to update this assumption, even while it
would be allowed to make guesses with respect to valuations or
probabilities that remain unknown. If the regulator changes these valuations
without explanation in order to maintain that is no longer cost-justified
based on the posterior with respect to the assumption in question, then the
reviewer may well be skeptical that the regulator acts in good faith. 149
D.

Two Examples
1.

The EEOC’s ADA Regulations

In 2011, the EEOC issued a regulation that expanded the definition
of “disability,” broadening the class of people entitled to “reasonable
accommodation” under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 150 The EEOC
expected the regulation to benefit disabled people by entitling them to
assistance and other forms of accommodation from their employers, which
would in turn also make it more difficult for employers to fire them for
failing to perform their job adequately. 151 The EEOC also acknowledged
that the regulation would impose costs on employers, who would be
required to provide possibly expensive accommodations and to retain
people who do not contribute much to the bottom line. 152
On the cost side, the EEOC used surveys and other sources of
information to estimate the total number of people in the work force with
disabilities and the fraction of them not covered by the older, narrower
definition. The final estimate was $12-38.4 million. 153 Another survey (of
disabled people) suggested that 16 percent of the people under the new
definition would request a new accommodation that would be required
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To our knowledge, there has not been any discussion in the legal literature of the use of
Bayesian cost-benefit analysis by regulators. However, Bayesian approaches to costeffectiveness analysis, which is closely analogous, have been explored in the medical
literature. See, e.g., Andrew H. Briggs, A Bayesian Approach to Stochastic CostEffectiveness Analysis, 17 Inter’l J. Technology Assessment 69 (2001). And there has been
some discussion by law professors of Bayes’ rule in the context of policy evaluation. See
QALYS AND POLICY EVALUATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE, Matthew D. Adler,
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics; Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go
Bayesian?
(unpublished
manuscript
2007),
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=991335.
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Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (March 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29
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under the new regulation. That implied 2.0-6.1 million requests. 154 Next,
using another source of data (from a survey of employers), the EEOC
estimated the mean cost of an accommodation of $150. After further
calculations, the EEOC estimated the cost of the regulation at $60-$183
million per year. 155
On the benefits side, the EEOC acknowledged that in its preliminary
impact analysis, it did not attempt to quantify or even itemize the possible
benefits from the regulation. 156 In response to comments, it noted that a
survey existed that separately itemized the benefits of accommodation
(“company retained a valued employee;” “increased the employee’s
productivity;” etc.). While the survey did not ask employers for the
monetary value of these benefits, the EEOC observed that retention is
valuable because it avoids the cost of hiring a person—which on average
was $1,978 in 2009. The EEOC also said that the regulation would improve
“efficiencies in litigation,” create “fuller employment” (which “will
stimulate the economy”), generate “non-discrimination and other intrinsic
benefits” which would reduce “stigma, exclusion, and humiliation, and
promote[] self-respect,” and so on. 157
This analysis of benefits is plainly inadequate. Most of the benefits
are not estimated. The one quantification implicitly assumes that an
employer would not (on average) voluntarily pay $150 for an
accommodation in order to avoid spending $1,978 to find a replacement.
The EEOC could have, and should have, done better.
The starting point is to estimate the value of the accommodations to
employees. To use one of the EEOC’s examples, the regulation might
mandate an employer to offer voice-recognition technology to an employee
who has multiple sclerosis and hence difficulty typing. The worker would
clearly be willing to pay a positive amount for this assistance, which will
make work easier or more pleasurable. That amount could be estimated
with the help of surveys; even if surveys are too expensive, the regulator
may be able to make some reasonable guesses. For example, if the worker is
paid $20 per hour, and must work 5 hours in order to perform work that
other workers can do in 4 hours, then the benefit is worth $20 for every 5
hours of work. (In 5 hours, the worker can earn $120 rather than $100.)
Similar sorts of calculations can be performed for other types of
accommodations.
The EEOC would also need to take into account the fact that the
regulation takes place within the labor market. This raises two additional
154
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issues. First, the EEOC would need to satisfy itself that employers do not
offer accommodations that would save themselves money. This is, of
course, possible; but it is most likely to be true when the benefits do not
fully accrue to the employer. For example, if an accommodation requires
the employer to train the worker to use voice-recognition technology, the
employer will not capture the benefits of the training if the worker uses this
training at home or in future jobs.
Second, the EEOC must take into account the risk that employers
might refuse to hire disabled people because of the cost of providing them
with accommodations. The EEOC’s bland assurance that the regulation
would increase employment is belied by empirical evidence that the ADA
reduced rather than increased employment of disabled people. 158 A
framework exists for estimating the possible unemployment effects of
mandates, and the EEOC should be required to use it in order to estimate
the employment effects of the regulation. 159
A final point is that even if the EEOC could not have reasonably
undertaken these calculations, we think it would be of value if the EEOC
simply stated an explicit guess as to what it believed the benefits of the
regulation are. Imagine that the average wage of the people affected by the
regulation was $40,000, and that the effect of the regulation was either to
make work somewhat easier or to enable a person to take a more-preferred
over a less-preferred job. We could imagine the EEOC reasonably guessing
that an affected person would pay, say, $1000 for the accommodation. As a
result, the regulation would pass a cost-benefit analysis.
But this is not an empty exercise. For one thing, it would bar
outrageous guesses ($100,000 or even $10,000) that would rationalize a
much more expensive regulation. More important, the EEOC would be on
record. In future, employers would be permitted to come forth with survey
and related evidence that shows that workers value the benefits on average
at only $50 or $100. If employers plausibly made such a case, then the
EEOC would be required to declare that the regulation fails a cost-benefit
test.
2.

The EPA’s Mercury Regulation

The regulation in our data with the greatest projected economic cost
is EPA’s 2012 regulation of coal- and oil-fired power plants, which we
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described above. 160 This regulation was triggered by an EPA finding that
mercury—which these types of plants emit—is a hazardous air pollutant
that EPA must regulate under §§ 111 and 112 of the Clean Air Act. As we
explained, EPA quantified only one benefit from reducing mercury:
reduction in the harm to children’s intelligence from ingesting mercury
when eating freshwater fish. 161 EPA estimated that the regulation would
prevent the loss of 510.8 IQ points across all affected children, which it
valued at approximately $5 million (or $10,000 per point of IQ). 162 EPA
also quantified the regulatory benefits from reducing emissions of various
types of particulate matter, which would be affected by the same
technologies used to reduce mercury emissions. 163 EPA described these as
“co-benefits,” because the EPA’s authority to regulate power plants derives
from the fact that they emit mercury, and the benefits of reducing
particulate matter are ancillary to the regulation of mercury. EPA calculated
that the particulate matter reductions would result in more than $52 billion
in benefits, against approximately $9.6 billion in costs. 164
It might seem as though the EPA’s failures to quantify additional
mercury-related benefits should be irrelevant in light of this large disparity
between costs and benefits. But as we described in the introduction, that
was not the case. In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court struck down the
regulation because of the disparity between costs and benefits of the
mercury effects alone. 165 The explanation stems from the nature of EPA’s
legal authority. EPA was required to “perform a study of the hazards to
public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions”166
and then promulgate regulations if it finds that “regulation is appropriate
and necessary” with respect to any given air pollutant. 167 EPA conceded,
and the Court agreed, that when it made this “appropriate and necessary”
finding with respect to mercury, only the benefits and costs related to
mercury were relevant. 168 That is, EPA was not permitted to account for any
160
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired
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ancillary regulatory benefits such as particulate matter reductions. If one
considers only mercury, the cost-benefit ratio looks very bad: $9.6 billion in
costs to only $5 million in benefits. 169 This unfavorable ratio placed EPA in
the uncomfortable position of having to argue that costs were irrelevant to
the appropriate-and-necessary finding, which triggered the EPA’s
obligation to regulate mercury. Despite the fact that EPA was entitled to
Chevron deference, this was an argument the Court could not accept.
EPA was right to perform a cost-benefit analysis and to promulgate
a regulation whose benefits exceeded its costs. Our point is that EPA’s
failure to fully quantify mercury benefits likely had both policy and legal
ramifications. From a policy perspective, EPA might well have chosen to
promulgate a more stringent regulation had it fully understood the benefits
of regulating mercury. And from a legal perspective, a more thorough
accounting of the benefits of eliminating mercury might have allowed the
rule to survive the Supreme Court’s aggressive standard of review. 170
What should EPA have done differently? To begin with, it should
have estimated the other mercury-related benefits it was aware of. EPA’s
Regulatory Impact Analysis lists several other unquantified mercury-related
benefits: reducing developmental delays, memory loss, and behavioral
dysfunctions; reductions in various harms to cardiovascular health; and
avoiding a variety of toxic immunologic effects. 171The regulation also
mentions environmental benefits to fish, birds, and mammals and to the
recreational hunters and fisherman who catch them. 172
Surprisingly, the agency acknowledged that it has access to
significant information on all of these effects. It has quantified the mercury
reduction from the regulation, which it estimates at approximately 19.9 tons
in the first year of the regulation (2015), and similar amounts in subsequent
years. 173 In order to determine the regulatory benefits to children, EPA first
determined which waterways the regulation would affect. Then, using
census tract data, it calculated the number of people living in proximity to
those waterways. It then employed survey data to determine the percentage
of those individuals who catch and eat freshwater fish. The EPA next used
fertility rate data to estimate the number of children who would be exposed
169
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to mercury prenatally when their mothers ate freshwater fish. 174 The EPA’s
model thus took the form:
# children exposed = # people near affected waterways ×
percentage who are anglers × fertility rate
The EPA ran this calculation on an extensive database comprising all
64,5000 census tracts and over 5,000 waterways to arrive at the conclusion
that approximately 239,000 children are affected each year. 175 Along the
way to this conclusion, EPA necessarily calculated the number of adults
who consumed mercury—the calculation of the number of affected children
is based upon the number of adults discounted by the fertility rate. But the
agency never reported this figure (or any of the underlying data); the
number of children is the only reported measure.
The EPA then used survey data and a database of over 50,000 water
samples it had tested to determine that the average mother (of these 239,000
children) would consume 3.04 micrograms of mercury per day. 176 The
agency used further modeling to estimate that this would produce a total IQ
loss across all children of 25,545 points, or approximately 1/10 of an IQ
point per child. The regulation will reduce mercury deposits by
approximately 2%, resulting in a net benefit of 510 IQ points, or
approximately 1/500 of an IQ point per child. 177
With its data on the number of affected adults (which the agency
possesses but does not report), its information on the reductions in mercury
composition, and models of the other health effects of mercury, the agency
could have provided further estimates of the benefits of mercury reduction.
And sources exist that could have been used to model the effects of mercury
reductions on other types of health benefits. The EPA directs anyone
seeking “more information” to the EPA’s own 2002 Integrated Risk
Information System (“IRIS”) on methylmercury, which includes models of
mercury’s health effects and the benefits of reducing exposure. 178 The EPA
also directs readers to a 2000 study by the National Resource Council of the
National Academy of Sciences, which “provides a thorough review of the
effects of [methylmercury] on human health.” 179 The EPA even produced
its own mercury study in a 1997 Report to Congress, which details many of
174
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the environmental harms associated with mercury and provides estimates of
the benefits of mitigation. 180 There is also a substantial body of nongovernmental scientific evidence documenting the effects of mercury
exposure on life and health. 181
To get a sense of the potential magnitude of these other health
effects, consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. Suppose
that the average adult lives until age 70, and that each adult has on average
one child. In any given year, if there are 239,000 children exposed to
mercury prenatally, there will be 16.73 million adults exposed. (Again, EPA
calculated but did not report this figure.) Imagine that mercury exposure at
current levels creates a 1 in 50,000 risk of suffering a fatal heart attack, and
that the effect is linear. That would mean that at current emissions levels,
334.6 adults will suffer fatal heart attacks due to mercury’s effects on
cardiovascular health. A regulation that reduced mercury concentrations by
2% would eliminate 6.7 fatal heart attacks. The EPA values a statistical life
at $7.3 million. 182 These cardiovascular benefits would then have a value of
$48.9 million—significantly higher than the IQ benefits.
To justify it failure to make these calculations, EPA argues that it
does not have “sufficient confidence in available data or methods,” that
“current evidence is only suggestive of causality or there are other
significant concerns over the strength of the association,” and it faces “time
and resource limitations.” 183 The agency should have offered its best
estimate of the regulation’s benefits given the information available to it,
while explaining and documenting any sources of uncertainty. This might
have cast the agency’s decision to regulate mercury, despite only $5 million
in quantified benefits, in a different light.
Less legally significant than the agency’s failure to estimate
additional mercury-related benefits is its failure to estimate the benefits of
reductions in ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon dioxide
emissions. 184 Any reduction in emissions from coal- and oil-fired electrical
180
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plants will necessary reduce emissions of these gases, along with mercury
and particulate matter. The benefits to life, health, and the environment
from reduced emissions of these four gases are extensive. 185 Moreover,
EPA has regulated all of these gases in different contexts, and so it has
already priced many of the benefits. 186 (With respect to these gases, the
EPA relied heavily on the excuse that it was constrained by “time and
resource limitations for this analysis.” 187) Even though a full accounting of
these benefits would not have refuted the legal challenge to this regulation,
EPA’s decision to leave them unquantified was nonetheless unwise.
CONCLUSION
Agencies regularly promulgate regulations for which they do not
fully quantify costs and benefits. This is far more the norm than the
exception; between 2010 and 2013, agencies promulgated only two major
regulations with fully quantified benefits and costs and more than 100
regulations without. In many cases, these regulations involved significant,
measurable costs in excess of $100 million and no quantified benefits.
Nonetheless, the agencies proceeded with the regulations based upon little
more than conclusory statements that, in the agencies’ judgments, the
benefits justified the costs. This is not sound practice.
We do not argue that agencies should regulate only when they can
monetize, with a high degree of confidence, all benefits and all costs To the
contrary, we advocate that agencies go Bayesian: an agency should state its
priors about the benefits and costs it cannot fully quantify; update those
priors given the evidence available to it; and proceed with regulation if it
still believes that the costs outweigh the benefits. The agency must make
clear its priors and provide as much information regarding costs and
benefits as it can gather, rather than omitting critical information. Those
priors should then be scrutinized and updated as further information
becomes available. Courts could reject as arbitrary and capricious any
regulation based upon priors that an agency does not properly update.
Uncertainty should not be an insurmountable barrier to agency action, but it
should not be used to provide cover for regulation that cannot be justified.
We also think that regulators should be allowed to cite equity,
dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts, but they must avoid using these
185
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ideas as boilerplate. Distributive impacts can and should be identified (they
never are). And none of these concepts should be used as an excuse for
failing to quantify benefits. If the regulators believes that a regulation that
fails a cost-benefit analysis should nonetheless be issued, it should still
disclose the cost-benefit analysis.
Uncertainty cannot be wished away, but it can be addressed with
institutional methods. Under the Bayesian approach, regulators will often
rely on priors—in the vernacular, they will have to “guess”. But they will be
required to identify them in quantitative terms, and use institutional
mechanisms to ensure that the priors are updated in a rigorous way. The
alternative is economically unsound, and may in some cases be legally fatal.
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